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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

f

DONNA LEE, a Minor, by and
through her Guardian ad Litem,
LOFTIN LEE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14128

JEANNE W. HOWES,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Donna Lee, by
and through her Guardian ad Litem, Loftin Lee, against the Defendant/
Respondent, Jeanne W. Howes, to recover damages for personal injuries
she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle-pedestrian collision which
occurred on November 5, 1973.
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the
lower court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of the case was held in the District Court of Salt
Lake County on the 26th and 27th days of March, 1975 before the Honorable
James S. Sawaya with a jury.

The case was submitted to the jury on

special verdict, and on March 27, 1975 the special verdict was returned
by the jury in which six jurors found that the defendant was not negligent, with two dissenting, and all the jurors ruled that the plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was negligent and that her negligence caused her injuries.

The court

entered its judgment on the verdict in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action.
motion for a new trial on two grounds:

The plaintiff made a timely

(1) Insufficiency of the

evidence to justify the verdict, and (2) error in law.

On May 6, 1975

the court entered its order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower court and
order denying the motion for new trial reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as this appeal is largely predicated upon the proposition that the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury's
special verdict, the plaintiff will summarize all of the pertinent
evidence relating thereto for the convenience of the court.
Plaintiff Donna Lee testified that she was 14 years of age.
(R. 153) That she lived three houses from the corner of Mantle Avenue
and 2200 West on the east side of the street,

(R. 155) That she

washed the face of a boy named Brian who had been throwing a snowball
at her, and left him lying on the ground about 25 feet from the corner,
that she turned and observed that he was not going to come after her.
She stepped off the curb, remembered looking both ways and could not
see anything.

(R. 157) There was a street light right above the

crosswalk which fairly well illuminated the area, but she still
could not see anything.

She remembered seeing the white line of the

crosswalk from her left eye and of proceeding a foot or two, but could
not remember anything else from there.

(T. 20) She might have been
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running when she left Brian in the snow, but she knew that he was not
chasing her as he was still on the ground.

(R. 193) She looked to

the left and did not see anything, and she looked to the right and did
not see anything.

(R. 195) She did not remember ever seeing the

defendant's vehicle, and does not know where it hit her, nor where she
was when she was hit.

(R. 197)

Deputy Sheriff Holger V. Jensen testified that he arrived at
the scene of the accident after the pedestrian had been taken into the
house.

(R. 207) He could not find any skid marks or any blood to

determine initial contact.

Two hours later he established contact with

the defendant and her husband at the Valley Fair Mall station.
He identified the defendant and her husband in the courtroom.

(R. 208)
The first

thing he asked Mrs. Howes was why she left the scene, and she said she
was on her way home from work at the Valley Fair Mall, got nervous and
really did not know what to do, so she wcmt home to talk to her husband.
She said she did not see the victim until she hit her.
she was going around 40 miles per hour.

She indicated

(R. 210) The officer noted

this on his accident report and independently recalled her stating
that her speed was around 40 miles per hour.

She said nothing about

being worried because of the agitation at: the scene of the accident
for her own safety.

The posted speed limit at the scene of the accident

was 30 miles per hour, a residential area.

(R. 211) He observed

damage to the right side of the hood, headlight and grill.

(R. 218)

Larry Lee testified that he was the brother of the plaintiff
and was in the living room of house #4255 watching TV when Marilyn
knocked on the door and told him that Donna was hit.

He ran across

the street to house #4246 and called the ambulance and the police, and
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went outside to see how she was.

She; was lying by the mailbox on the

grass, completely off the side of the: road.

She was mumbling and not

making any sense, talking out of her head.
going on.

(R. 221^ 222) He noticed a little car sitting up the street

and started walking toward it.
was lying.

She did not know what was

It was about 40 feet from where Donna

He knew it was a light color.

(R. 223) The girl walked

toward him and turned around and then somebody else got out of the car.
They switched drivers, she getting into the passengers side and the
other person got into the drivers side. When he first saw the girl
there were no taillights burning, but: they turned on their lights after
proceeding past a couple of houses.

(R. 224, 225)

Billy Lee testified that he was 15 years of age and a cousin
of the plaintiff.

He lived in house #4246.

(R. 231) He first became

aware of the accident when Marilyn came into the house and said that
Donna was hit.

He saw Donna lying by the bushes by the mailbox.

was mumbling and did not know what she was saying.

She

(R. 232) He

observed a light colored small car with its lights out on the side of
the road.

(R. 233)

Julie Lee, cousin of the plaintiff, testified that she was 12
years old.

(R. 234) She was on the corner where the crosswalk starts

when the accident occurred, watching the "goofing" around.
Donna wash Brian's face.

(R. 235) Brian was sitting on the ground

brushing the snow off his face and was not mad
longer lives in this vicinity.

or anything.

He no

As Donna started to leave she started

to walk after her about two feet behind her.
and the car was coming.

She saw

She looked at plaintiff

(R. 236) Plaintiff started to cross the inter-

section in the pedestrian lane.

"As I was looking at her she was
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running across the street.

I wasn't going to run.

I was looking first

and then Donna looked and then she was running and I seen the car come and
then I seen her hit the roof and then she flew off." She said that the
car she saw coming did not have lights on. After Donna was hit she
flew and then all of them ran over to where she was.
came to rest about where the mailbox is.

(R. 237) She

She appeared to leave the

pedestrian lane after the center of the street and got out of the pedestrian lane about one or two feet when she was struck.

After she ran

over to the plaintiff, she saw a car facing south about three houses
down from her house.

(R. 238, 259) She saw Larry and Billy walking

over and then the car left.
than the witness.
thing.

(R. 240)

The witness looked to the left and did not see any-

No cars passed from the left.

the car.

Tie plaintiff was running faster

She looked to the right and saw

Donna was already in the middle.

at the car it did not have its lights on

(R. 247) When Julie looked
(R. 248) Julie testified

that the plaintiff did not immediately fly off the car when she was
hit.

"It seemed like she was carried and then she had flewfen up."--

Carried her maybe about a half a foot or so and then she flew off the
car.

She was only a foot or two off the crosswalk when she was struck.

(R. 249) The car that she observed strike Donna was the same car that
she later saw stopped up the road.

(R. 250)

Wanda Jensen, grandmother of the plaintiff who took care of her
immediately following the accident, testified that she was very disoriented and could not remember anything.

(R. 270)

William Y. Tipton, engineer, testified about the preparation of
the map with a scale of one inch representing ten feet.

(R. 275)

The defendant testified that she worked at Z.C.M0I. at the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Valley Fair Mall and was driving a Toyota automobile.

(R. 290) She

had driven along 2200 West street on this same route every day for
three years.

(R. 291) She left work at about 6:20.

It was dark so

she could not see without her headlights and had them on.

(R. 292)

She knows that she was going 25 miles per hour.
ff

Q.

And you have heard testimony in court that the officer

claims you told him you were going forty, is that true?
n

A.

I don't remember telling him that.11

She looked at her speedometer after she was through the intersection of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West.

(R. 293) After she got through

the intersection a car passed going north with really bright lights
which affected her vision.
she checked her speed.

It was right before the car passed that

She was right up in front of the white house

(#4246) when the car passed.

(R. 2S4) The car struck the plaintiff

on the front end on the right side. When asked if the plaintiff stayed
on the car or rolled off it, she said she just went over the edge.
(R. 295) The defendant then pulled over and stopped as soon as she
could, got out of the car, saw the girl lying by the hedge on the
ground.

(R. 296)
"A.

I got out of my car.

I wanted to help.

I wanted to see

if there was anything I could do.
"Q.

All right.

Did you go to help?

,f

A. No. I didn!t.

"Q.

What happened to change your mind?

"A.

I was really scared by the way that they were acting, you

know, because they were scared and I was scared.
fl

Q.

Did anyone begin to approach you during this?
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"A. Yes.
"Q.

And would you descri.be him?

"A.

They were -- it was dark.

It was really dark and all I

could see was a dark figure coming at me.
"Q.

All right. What did you do?

f,

A.

I went to get my husband.

H

Q.

And how did you do that?

"A.

I just got in my car and went to get him."

(R. 297, 298)

Defendant denied that anyone else was with her at the time.
She drove home to get her husband where she explained to him what had
happened and he called the police.

(R. 299) On cross-examination she

testified that she checked her speedometer right before the car passed
her
H

Q.

Well, now, I think I would like you to come down if you

will and just mark on this map -•• now, understand this is ten feet to
the inch.
M

This is the crosswalk,

This is the intersection.

I want you to mark on that map where you were when you last

looked at your speedometer before the impact to see that you were
going -- this one will be better -- to see that you were going twentyfive miles per hour?
c

M

A.

About right here I would say.

,f

Q. Why don't you just put a cross there?

,f

A. Well, the car went by.

ff

Q.

fl

Did the car go by before you looked at your speedometer?

A. No.

It was right before I looked and so it was about

right here.
ff

Q.

Now, let me get this straight:

This car that came from
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the south going north with its bright lights, did it pass you before
you looked at your speedometer or after?
,f

A. Before.

No, I looked at my -- I looked at the speedometer

before the car passed.
lf

Q.

All right.

And you have put yourself about here?

"A. Yes.
,f

I am just going to put here 'Looked at speedometer.1

Q.

that correct?

Is

About here?

ff

A. Yeah."

When asked how far this car with bright lights was when she
first saw it coming, she said she can see a long ways down the road
and she knew it was coming and she knew during all that period of time
that it had bright* lights on.

She could not say whether it was on high

beam or low beam, the lights were just bright.

(R. 302)

f,

Q. Well, did they blind you sufficiently that you couldn't

see the road in front of you?
n

A.

"Q.

I wouldn't -- no, I wouldn't say that.
Would they blind you sufficiently that you couldn't see

objects ahead of you that you normally would be able to see?
"A. No.
"Q.

As a matter of fact, they didn't blind you enough that you

started to decrease your speed as a result of those bright lights did
you?
"A. Yes, I had already started to slow down.
"Q.

When did you start to slow down?

"A. Well, from -- there is a light.

There is another light

up here and I wasn't going very fast along that road.

I was trying to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

keep it down.
f!

Q.

(R. 303)

Let me ask it one at a time.

Did you attempt to reduce

your speed at any time before you actually hit her?
"A. Before I hit her?
"Q.

Uh-huh.

,f

I was just going down the road my normal speed.

lf

Of twenty-five miles per hour?

A.
Q.

,f

A. Yes.

U

Q.

All right.

Now, and you are still going that normal speed

when you hit her?
fl

A. Yes.

ff

Q.

All right.

So at no time prior to the time you hit her

did you decrease your speed?
"A. No.
M

Q.

Even though the car was approaching you with bright lights

that might have interfered with your view of the area?
"A. Yes.,f

(R. 305)

With respect to the lookout she maintained, the defendant
testified as follows:
fl

Q.

All right.

Now, you say this girl came from your left

immediately in front of you. Where was .she with respect to the center
of 2200 West when you first saw her?
,f

A.

She was just right in front of me.

lf

Q. All right.

So she •-- you didn't see her at all until she

had passed the center of the highway and was right in front of you?
"A. Yes.
ff

Q.

Had she -- when you first saw her had she passed your
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left front?

You hit her with your right front?

Was she right directly

in front of you when you first saw her?
"A. YeS.

-

:.,.:,';,'.. r:;,,.:;::-.;

ff

Or was she slightly to your left?

lf

She was right in front of me.

lf

So that you are saying is that you actually didn't see her

Q.

A.

Q„

at all until you hit her?
ff

A. Yes.

fl

Q.

How did you know she was running?

ff

A. Because I could tell.

There was -- she was running be-

cause I could see her arms and her legs going.
fl

Q. Well, I thought you said you didn't see her until you hit

her.
n

A.

Well, she was in motion when she -- when I hit her. (R. 306)

l!

Q.

She didn't?

Now, do you have any explanation for your not

seeing this -- the plaintiff when she entered the street to come in
front of you?
"A.

She was just right there.

,i

ff

Q. Well, how do you think she got right there?

fl

She must of ran.

"Q.

But in running to arrive at this point where -- you say

A.

she was struck right by this mailbox?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

(R. 307)

Right where she was lying after the accident?

"A. Yes.
n

Q.

And to get to this point which was on the extreme right-

hand side of your lane because you hit her with the right side of your
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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car did you not?
"A. Yes.
,f

Q.

To get to that point: she had to traverse the full width

of this street which the engineer has measured at eighteen and a half
feet to the center line and fourteen and two-tenths feet to this edge,
she had to travel over thirty feet to get to the point where you hit
her, is this correct?
"A. Yes.
H

Q.

How do you explain the fact that you did not see her

whether she was walking or running or however she was going during the
thirty feet that she was proceeding into the street ahead of you before
you saw her?
f,

She was just there and I think she had dark clothes on.

,f

Do you think she was: running faster than your car was

"A.

I -- I really couldn't say.

,f

All right. After you stopped your car by this driveway

A.
Q.

moving?

Q.

I don't know.

(R. 308)

you saw a group of children standing on the other side of the road in
the vicinity of this house?
lf

A. Yes.

,f

Q. Which was about directly across from where the girl was

lying off the side of the road?
"A. Yes.
n

Q.

And you saw these children run over to where she was

lying?
"A. Yes.
ff

Q.

And that's when you -- and you saw one or two of them
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coming in your direction?
M

person.

A.

You didnft know who it was coming toward you?

Well, one of the girls ran back to the house to get another

I am not sure who that was but that's the person that started

walking up toward the car.
"Q.

At this time you didn't want him to know who you were or

what you were doing?
M

A.

No.

I didn't mind if he knew who I was.

I just thought

that since there was all those people there I was frightened and I
wanted my husband there."

(R. 311)

When asked directly if she told the officer about being blinded
by lights of an approaching car, "I told him that there was a car that
passed."

(R. 312)

In describing her actions to the officer after the accident,
she testified further:
"Q.

Tell me what that conversation was.

"A.

I was really upset.

"Q.

Well, I think you -- did you tell him that you struck the

I am not really sure what he said to

us.

girl?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

Did you tell him where you were when you struck her?

"A.

I don't think he asked me that.

"Q.

But you didn't tell him that?

"A.

I explained it.

I mean, you know, I was telling him what

had happened, yes.
"Q.

Did you tell him that this girl suddenly darted across the

road in front of you?
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"A. Yes, and he said that something -- that she was in the
crosswalk and she said that -- or not she -- he said that someone told
him that she was in the crosswalk and I said that she wasn't and he
said that he agreed with me.
"Q.

He said that he didn't think she was either.

And did you tell him how fast you were going at that time?

"A. Yes, I did.
lf

Q. And what did you tell him about your speed?

fl

A.

I said twenty-five niles an hour.

M

Q.

Did -- did you tell him how you knew that?

(R. 314)

Now, I am

talking about the conversation you had with him in the presence of your
husband in his car.
"Ao Yes.
f,

Q.

In the front of your apartment did you tell him when you

looked at the speedometer to determine ycur speed?
"A.

I don't think he asked me that either and I -- I really

can't remember.
"Q.

^ .

You don't remember telling him when you looked at your

speed?
"A. Yes, when I looked at the speedometer.
"Q.

Did you tell him that you looked at your speedometer at

all at that time --

;}

"A.

I am —

"Q.

(Continuing) --to find out how fast you were going?

"A.

I can't remember if I told him or not.

"Q.

All right. Did you in the car at any time tell the

officer that a car with bright lights had passed just before you
struck the girl?
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:.:..'.-,

"A. Yes. Yes.
ff

Q. You are sure of this?

M

A.

Yes.

"

:. - . v - . / , ••-...,:-...-

f,

Q. You have a definite memory that in the car in front of

your home in the presence of your husband you told him that?
lf

A.

That a car had passed.

M

Q.

With bright lights?

f,

A. With bright lights.11

(R. 315)

When asked at what time with respect to the collision the car
with the bright lights passed, she testified as follows:
M

A.

It passed and then she was there.

I am not -- it all

happened so fast I am not really sure..
ff

Q. You say she was there simultaneously?

ff

A. Yes.

lf

Q.

In other words, the very moment that it passed she was

there in front of your car and you couldn't see her arrive at that
point?

Is this correct?

mony to you.

I don't want to put: any -- suggest any testi-

I want you to tell me.

I understand this car with bright

lights you say affected your view of the highway but you hadn't at
that point applied any brakes nor had you decreased your speed at that
point when the lights affected your view, is this correct?
"A.

Right

"Q.

(By Mr. White) Whatever effect the approaching bright

lights of this car had on you it was not sufficient to incline you to
reduce your speed by reason of the bright lights, is this correct?
ft

A. Yes.

"Q.

This is correct?
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"A. Yes. Yes. Yes.

t>

,f

Q. And then this car passed with the bright lights and

immediately right in front of your car was this girl, is this correct?
"A.

The car had gone past, yes.

fl

But immediately after it passed the girl was right in front

Q.

of your car?

*

"A.
the girl.11

^

It's been so long ago but the car did pass and then I hit
(R. 317, 318)

;

^

Marilyn McCandless, testifying for the defendant, stated that
she was 16 years old and a friend of the plaintiff.

(R. 320, 321)

That after washing Brian's face in the snow, Donna ran across
the street.

(R. 323) The witness stopped at the gutter.

car coming.

(R. 324)

She saw the car before Donna got hit.

She saw a

Marilyn testified that

the plaintiff entered the crosswalk and remained in it until about the
center of the street and then took an angle off to the other side.
(R. 326) On further direct examination, the witness testified that
she did not see the car at any time before it hit the plaintiff.

She

herself had been following Donna, but didnft know why she did not go
into the street.

(R. 332) She testified that Donna was about 25 feet

ahead of her when she was running across the street and was passed the
middle when the witness first saw the car that she thought was going
to hit her, and that is why the witness stopped.

As they approached

the pedestrian lane, and prior to plaintiff's being hit, the witness
saw no other car coming from the south.

(R. 335) She saw no lights

on the car that struck Donna, but she could not say there were no
lights on it,

(R. 338) On recrossexamination she corrected the
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written statement she had previously given the counsel for the defendant (Exhibit D-2) by testifying that since writing the statement she
had learned that Billy Lee was not there, so she had been mistaken in her
recollection.

She was also mistaken in her statement in saying that

Donna washed Billy's face, because Billy was not there.

In her written

statement she said that both boys started to chase us, but Brian was
the only one there.

(R. 340) She testified that the car carried the

plaintiff a distance before she fell to the road.

(R. 341) She

described the distance between the edge of the crosswalk and where Donna
was hit as 15 little steps, heel to toe.

(It. 343)

William Howes, husband of the defendant, testified that he
called the Valley Fair Mall office after he was informed by his wife
that she had been in an accident.
to the vehicle as follows:

(R. 347) He described the damage

f!

The hood --it has a curving front hood

ori it and the front of the hood was pushed into the grill and the headlight was broken on the right side."

(R. 348, 349) Did not recall

his wife telling the officer that she was driving 40 miles per hour.
Did not hear her make any comment about her speed.

(R. 350)

Sheriff Jensen, called on rebuttal, testified that on the
occasion of his investigation, the defendant never did say anything
about another car with bright lights passing from the opposite direction
just before impact, nor did she mention a car with bright lights to
him at all.

(R. 352)

Dr. Robert Lee Youngblood, plastic surgeon, described plaintiff's injuries as follows: Multiple injuries, obviously healing
lacerations or cuts, scrapes, bruises and some areas where skin had been
torn away from her head, her left shoulder, her left arm, her right
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hand, her left buttocks and both legs and feet.

(R. 254) She would

have some permanent scarring which was disfiguring.
true of the left elbow and left ankle.

This was especially

The elbow scar probably would

cause tenderness and irritation, and he recommended corrective plastic
surgery for the elbow (R. 255) which surgery, requiring hospitalization,
had been scheduled.

(R. 257, 258) He further testified that the

plaintiff had suffered a brain concussion.

(R. 264)

Dr. Gary F. Larsen, orthopedic surgeon, after describing
plaintiff's injuries in some detail (R. 160, 161), stated that they
were the kind of injuries that would be sustained by somebody being
hit and then sliding along the pavement.

(R. 162) He further testi-

fied that a concussion is a bruising of the brain with secondary swelling and loss of consciousness and then amnesia for the event that caused
the head injury and a little while before that and then for various
periods or length of time after the injury, depending upon the severity
of the concussion.

Most neurosurgeons really define cerebral concussion

as a loss of memory, both for the event and a little bit before the
injury and afterwards.

(R. 165)

The foregoing medical summary of injuries is included in the
Statement of Facts as it throws some light upon the nature of the
accident, as well as furnishing a medical, explanation for plaintiff's
inability to remember events following her entry into the crosswalk.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
At the conclusion of the events, plaintiff asked the court in
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her requested instruction #6 to instruct the jury that under the
evidence presented in the case, the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law.

(R. 27) This request was denied.

The evidence of all of the

witnesses who testified at the trial, including the defendant herself,
clearly and conclusively established negligence on the part of the
defendant.

The defendant admitted that she did not see the plaintiff

until she hit her.

The plaintiff had not just stepped off the curb

into her path, but had traversed a minimum distance of 50 feet in
arriving at the point where she was struck, and under the testimony of
the two eye witnesses who saw the impact and the plaintiff's actions
prior thereto, the plaintiff entered the crosswalk and remained in it
until she reached the middle of the street, -he one witness placing
her within a foot or two of the crosswalk when She was hit, and the
defendant's witness placed her less than 15 ::eet from the crosswalk
when hit (15 toe to heel measurements of the witnessfs feet).
intersection had the benefit of a street light.

(Exhibit D-l)

The
If

defendant was in fact traveling at her claimed rate of speed of 25 miles
per hour, certainly she had ample time to observe the plaintiff as she
entered and proceeded in the pedestrian lane? had she been paying any
reasonable attention to the road ahead of her.

Indeed, the defendant

was very familiar with the area, having traversed it twice each working
day for approximately three years driving to and from work; and she
knew of its residential character, and was under a duty to anticipate
that children would be in the general area.
obstruct her view.

There was nothing to

Even if the point of impact was at or near the

mailbox, as defendant claimed, this would have placed the plaintiff
in the street for a distance of 100 feet from the northeast corner of
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the intersection where the plaintiff started to cross the street.
It is true that the defendant claimed that her vision was
affected by the car passing with bright lights, but on cross-examination
she testified that they did not blind her sufficiently that she could
not see the road in front of her, nor did they blind her sufficiently
that she could not see objects in front of her that she normally would
have been able to see. Furthermore, notwithstanding her claim of the
approaching bright lights, she did not at any time decrease her speed
prior to hitting the plaintiff.

Counsel for the plaintiff realizes

that the jurors are the exclusive judges: of the credibility of the
witnesses, but we nevertheless feel inclined to suggest to the Court
that the jury appeared not to have been disturbed by the incredibility
of defendant's assertions that she looked at her speedometer and
observed that she was going 25 miles per hour at a point 15 feet from
the mailbox,where she said she struck the girl, that while she was
traversing that 15 feet at 25 miles per hour, the car with bright
lights passed, which she had observed further up the street, and - immediately after the car with bright lights passed, the plaintiff
appeared directly in front of her vehicle.

In the exercise of their

function to pass on the credibility of the witnesses, they were not
justified in establishing credibility by impossibility.

How could any

reasonable view of the evidence result in a finding that it preponderated in favor of the defendant's freedom from negligence, when the
defendant admitted that she did not see the plaintiff until she hit
her, and the plaintiff was in her plain view for a period of several
seconds, whether she was traversing the distance of over 100 feet,
indicated by defendant's testimony, or of 50 feet as indicated by the
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testimony of defendant's witness, Marilyn McCandless, and plaintiff's
witness, Julie Lee?
If the defendant was going 25 miles per hour as she approached
the intersection, and continued at that speed without reduction of
acceleration until impact, she would have had even more time and
opportunity within which to adjust co the presence of the plaintiff
running in the street than if she were going the 40 miles per hour
which she admitted to the investigating officer.

Furthermore, the

defendant is not assisted by the claim that her view was impaired by
the car passing with bright lights.

She admitted that the lights did

not prevent her from seeing the road in front of her, nor objects ahead
of her that she would normally be able to see, and that the lights did
not blind her sufficiently to encourage her to reduce her speed at any
time before she struck the plaintiff.

(R. ;J03)

Even if, contrary to

her own testimony, the defendant's ability t;o see the road ahead of
her or other objects in the road was impaired because of the bright
lights, then she was certainly under a duty to reduce her speed of 25
miles per hour as long as the interference with her view existed or was
threatened.

She saw this car with its lights approaching from a con-

siderable distance ahead, and was unable to testify that they were high
beam rather than low beam lights.
The defendant was negligent in failure to yield right of way
under any reasonable view that could be taken of the evidence.

It is

undisputed in the evidence that plaintiff was in the crosswalk until
she reached the center of the street.

The defendant should have seen

her in the exercise of ordinary care, and should have at least started
to yield the right of way to her even before she arrived at the middle
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of the street.

If she did not want to yield the right of way, she

should have at least decreased her speed, whatever it was, applied
brakes, or taken some evasive action,in the exercise of ordinary care,
to avoid injuring the plaintiff, Realizing that the defendant struck
the plaintiff with her right front headlight and fender near the right
edge of the traveled portion of the highway, any decrease of speed or
other evasive action would have prevented the injury of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff respectfully refers to the case of Larson v. Evans»
12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 decided October 3, 1961. That was a
case for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident.

The

trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was negligent as a
matter of law because of his admitted failure to stop for the stop
sign, and the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was submitted to the jury in interrogatory form for their determination as
to whether plaintiff (a) failed to keep a proper lookout, (b) did not
have his car under control, or (c) was driving too fast for existing
conditions.

The jurors answered the interrogatories in the affirmative

and further found that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.

The jury were directed by the court to return

a verdict against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and plaintiff's
motion for new trial was denied.

In reviewing the evidence, this

court held that the plaintiff in that action was not guilty of contributory negligence, despite the jury's finding to the contrary, in
any of the three respects covered by the interrogatories, and in so
ruling this court also repudiated the action of the trial court in
denying the motion for new trial.
In the case at bar, the evidence most favorable to the
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defendant shows that the defendant, having ample opportunity to do so,
failed to see the plaintiff until she hit her.

The undisputed evidence

presented by both parties conclusively shows that the plaintiff

<

entered the crosswalk and remained in it until she arrived at the
middle of the street, and that she was struck within 15 feet of the
crosswalk.

The defendant, whose testimony was otherwise incredible,

claimed that she was driving 25 miles per hour and not the 40 miles
per hour that was admitted to the sheriff during his investigation;
but the slower the defendant was traveling, the more opportunity she
had to observe the plaintiff and take measures to avoid striking her
before arriving at the point of impact.

Notwithstanding all of this

showing, the jury found that the negligence of the crosswalk-traveling
plaintiff was the proximate cause of her injuries, and this finding
was made in the face of the fact that any split second delay in defendant's arrival at the point of impact would have prevented the collision,
as previously discussed in this brief.

We respectfully submit that

in this case, as in the Larson case, this court, under the evidence
in the furtherance of justice, should repudiate the action of the jury
and the trial court by granting plaintiff a new trial with the issue
of defendant's negligence being declared as a matter of law and removed from jury consideration.
See also Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 850; 366 P.2d 701.
In the case of Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435; 326 P.2d 722,
this court repudiated the verdict of the jury absolving the defendant
of negligence, holding that the evidence was ample to support a verdict
for the child and insufficient to justify the verdict of no cause of
action.

In that case the child was struck about four and one-half
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feet after entering the street, and the defendant was traveling at a
speed of 25 miles per hour with his headlights on.

In the case at bar

the plaintiff child was within a few inches from completing the crossing of the street when she was struck by the defendant, and the
defendant had much more time within which to observe her position in
the street and decrease her speed,
-

.:

^

-.
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•;„:• POINT II

THE TRIM. COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFfS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION #8. :
;

., ,

; b

; ^

-

K

b

v

This instruction was to the effect that the defendant was

lender a duty, while operating a motor vehicle in a residential area,
to exercise reasonable care to observe the presence of children or
other persons who may be reasonably expected to be on or near the
street upon which defendant's vehicle was being operated.
did, in fact, occur in a residential area.

The accident

The defendant was very

familiar with its residential character, having traversed the area
twice a day to and froxn work for a period of approximately three years.
No other instruction was given by the court covering the subject
matter of the denied request.
-;•-:....-,,, -:,., : ;

... ,
POINT III

* <

,..,.',•,-...-

-';, --•/-' :,:

— ; : -IM .

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
..;••;••< ,, It was the manifest duty of the trial judge to have granted
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, having committed error in refusing
plaintiff's request to charge the jury that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and having refused to instruct the jury with
respect to the residential character of the location of the accident
as it affected defendant's duty to exercise ordinary care in the
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operation of her vehicle. The motion for new trial was based on two
grounds:

(1)

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict

other decision or that it is against law, and (2) error in law.

or

It is

clear that the jury completely ignored the court's instructions on duty
to maintain lookout, failure to yielc. right of way, and all of the
instructions relating to the preponderance of the evidence in finding
that the defendant was not negligent, notwithstanding all of the
evidence presented to them as summarized in the Statement of Facts,
and this finding of the jury was shockingly insupportable considering
the defendant's admission of not seeing the plaintiff until she hit
her, when the plaintiff was in her plain view for a period of several
seconds, and when any decrease of speed or evasive action on defendant's
part would have prevented the injury.

The trial court's failure to

grant a new trial in this case was not just an abuse of discretion.
It was a failure on the part of the trial court to exercise its responsibility to preside over a trial dedicated to the proposition that
justice is more important than a blind veneration for unreasonable
jury action.

The jury had the duty of discovering the ultimate truth

and of finding the factual issues, but they also had the duty to follow
the instructions of the court with respect to the law applicable to
the case, and particularly the instructions with respect to the preponderance of the evidence and the duties of the parties to the lawsuit.
It is apparent that the jury disregarded altogether the
testimony of the two girls who placed the plaintiff in the crosswalk
until she arrived at the middle of the street, and one of these
witnesses was a witness testifying on behalf of the defendant.

How

could any of the jurors have reasonably held that the defendant should
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not have seen the plaintiff as she approached the intersection in time
to decrease her speed, whatever it was, by taking her foot off the
accelerator, applying her brakes, or taking some evasive action in the
exercise of reasonable care to avoid injuring the plaintiff, realizing
that any split second delay in the arrival of defendant's vehicle at
the point where the impact occurred would have prevented it?
Justice Crockett, speaking for this court in Hyland v. St.
Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134; 427 P.2d 736 at page 137 of the Utah
Reports, stated:

. >;. .-.•

••'"••••"'

"We have indeed frequently affirmed the importance
of trial by jury. However, it must be realised that
even a jury is not: so sacrosanct as to be beyond the
possibility of error. Like other aspects of authority
in our system of government under law, it is essential
that there be some check against arbitrariness, abuse
>>.....,..-. or mistake. The safeguard against this is the
authority of the trial judge who has supervisory
control over the proceedings and is charged with the
ultimate responsibility of seeing that justice is
. d o n e . To accomplish that purpose it is essential
that his power to grant or deny motions for nex?
trial be recognized. This is necessarily something
more than simply to rule as a matter of law that the
evidence w^ll or vOU! not support a verdict. The
latter would only allow him to judge whether the
verdict should be sustained as a matter of law, and
would not permit £.ny latitude of discretion.

f

"Consistent with the purpose just discussed, whenever
what has transpired in the proceeding is so offensive
to the trial court's sense of justice that he believes
the desired objective of affording the parties a fair
trial has failed, he has both the prerogative and the
duty to grant a new trial. This court has always
recognized that the trial court has a broad discretion in doing so, and that his ruling thereon should
not be overturned unless it appears that his action was
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any reasonable bounds of discretion."
If under any set of facts the trial judge has not only the

prerogative but the duty to grant a new trial, this court, in the
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exercise of its appellate supervision of the trial court, also has a
duty to determine whether there was some sound basis for the trial
court's discretion, or whether the trial judge's duty was violated in
granting or denying the motion.

Ultimately the prerogative and.the

duty rests upon this court to follow its conscience and the law in
determining whether the trial judge abused his discretion, if he had
any, and violated his duty, if such violation is reasonably clear.
CONCLUSION
The court, having failed to instruct the jury that the
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and the jury
having rendered a verdict which was not supported by the evidence but
was directly against it, it became the clear duty of the trial court
to grant the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and thus repudiate,
rather than endorse, the shocking miscarriage of justice which had
occurred.

We respectfully urge this court, in the furtherance of

justice and right, to reverse the judgment of the court below, and
grant to plaintiff a new trial, with the direction that defendant be
adjudged negligent as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted.
WOOBROW D. WHITE
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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